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ABSTRACT
Within Southern studies scholarship, much has been said (or told) about "the
South" and southern distinction or essentialism. No one can define what, exactly, the
South or southernness is, but we are determined to spend much energy and ink writing
about it, anyway. Since the late 20th century, southern studies scholarship has largely
followed a discourse-focused trajectory, and the popular (or at least the loudest) answers
to questions about the South's distinction have often been angry “nos,” critical rejections
of a "special" South that functions—or even exists—outside of discourse. Though this
line of inquiry is well-intentioned, it has done little but divide southern studies scholars
into two sects: southern literary studies, which considers the South and its literature a
distinct culture worthy of critical attention, and the new southern studies, a group that
believes southernness is nothing but an ugly fantasy. The new visioning of the South that
this project aims to produce, one that takes seriously both the material and the discursive,
will disrupt the cycle in which Southern studies has found itself by offering an alternative
middle ground that maintains the South’s distinction without falling victim to essentialist
folly.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Within Southern studies scholarship, much has been said (or told) about "the
South" and southern distinction or essentialism. No one can define what, exactly, the
South or southernness is, but we are determined to spend much energy and ink writing
about it, anyway. I decided to explore this pervasive question not because I find it
interesting or useful, but because I find it terribly uninteresting and silly. The notion that
the South must be so thoroughly examined in order to be disproved is, to me, evidence
enough of its effective existence, but many leading southern studies scholars think
otherwise, and the field has spent decades trying to decide if the South is “real” or not.
The critical attention given to this conversation leaves me scratching my head, but it
seems that one cannot be a southernist without attending to it, and the engine driving this
project is my desire to discover why so many smart, respectable scholars would devote
time and effort to answering a question that does not seem to need asking.
I feel it is important to follow the path established by the many southernists who
came before me and begin by revealing my own southern subjectivity. Having come from
a long line of share croppers, pig farmers, power company linemen, and Southern Gospel
singers, I am a product of the culture many southernist scholars say is not and was never
there. I was raised in Florence, South Carolina (no relation to Dr. Rubin) but spent much
of my childhood travelling from church to church and spreading the Good News. Though
I take ownership over my personal southern history (not because it is good but because it
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made me), I also wish to make it clear that, as someone who has experienced the
silencing effects that lost cause or (what has been construed as) Agrarian ideation can
produce, my goal for this project is not to extol the virtues of a distinct South or privilege
a particularly Southern way of living. I am not a member of the old guard. However, the
work to problematize an "essential" South has long been done; that is not my battle. The
job I set out to do is to shine light on the discourse-based rendering of the South that
looms over the field. The contemporary southern diaspora that I find myself situated in is
not haunted by essentialism but by constructivism, and just as an essentialized South
silenced some and gave voice to others in problematic ways, a South located solely in
discourse has its own political agendas to serve. This project, then, does not aim to lay
waste to new southern studies scholarship but, rather, to take its contributions and use
them to new ends, ends that allow the South to exist and at in the world without praising
it. Southern studies has operated on the false proposition that to believe in the South is to
love it, and the work that follows hopes to prove this assumption wrong.
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CHAPTER 2
A HISTORY OF SOUTHERN STUDIES
In the 1980s, armed with the theoretical tools made possible by postmodern
literary and social criticism, a new branch of southernist scholars began poking holes in
what they interpreted as a problematic conception of an essential, unified South. Under
the emerging new southern studies paradigm, southern exceptionalism became nothing
more than the politically-charged imaginings of post reconstruction era intellectuals1, an
artistic creation that, outside of discourse, was never really there at all. Southern studies
scholarship has largely followed this discourse-focused trajectory, and the popular (or at
least the loudest) answers to questions about the South's distinction have often been angry
“nos,” critical rejections of a "special" South that functions—or even exists—outside of
discourse (Kreyling; Duck; Yeager; Smith). Though this line of inquiry is wellintentioned, it has done little but divide southern studies scholars into two sects: southern
literary studies, which considers the South and its literature a distinct culture worthy of
critical attention, and the new southern studies, a group that believes southernness is
nothing but an ugly fantasy (but still, apparently, worthy of study).

The “nature of the relationship” (Rubin 4) between the South and Southern Literature
has always sat center on the southern studies stage. In a 1972 conference paper, Louis D.
Rubin, the primary foil in Michael Kreyling’s indictment against southern literary
studies, made it clear that the discursive, literary South and the material south do not have
“a one-for-one relationship” (4), that “there is more than one South” (5). It seems that
southernists have never asked the South people live in to represent the South people write
about , and the ease with which early southernist scholars have assumed the role of
essentializing oppressor within the field’s most dominant narratives is best interpreted as
an act of fiction rather than a re-visitation of fact.
1
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The practical, obvious rebuttal to this line of reasoning is to cite the personal
experiences of a people in a particular geographic space and the peculiar history attached
to it as evidence to the contrary, to reply that the South is real because we experience it as
such, and there is nothing a room of theory-heads can do to make us forget it. However,
while lived experience may keep the South alive in the minds of southerners, it cannot
stand firmly within the critical conversations circulating among southern studies scholars.
Human subjectivity is highly contested, shaky ground, and using it as a foundation for a
configuration of southernness handicaps the ideas that will follow from the very start. Put
differently, since the individual as such does not occupy a privileged position of knowing
in the majority of contemporary theoretical ideas and approaches, the personal
experiences that many southern studies scholars call on as evidence that the South’s
existence are robbed of their force within the field. Further, with the troubled political
and social history that comes with the South and its culture, most are hesitant, at present,
to fight for it. Because southern studies has yet to develop a theoretical framework of
southern distinction that does not reiterate problematic social hierarchies, arguing for a
unique South is often conflated with arguing for traditional southern ideals and the
harmful ideology on which it operates. Thus, southernists who continue to "believe" in
the South have been silenced on the issue—they either ignore it or laugh at it, hopefully
supposing that it will go away. But it has not, and it seems that the best response to the
changes new southern studies has introduced to the field is to fight theory with theory, to
meet theoretical ideas on their own ground and speak their language, thereby establishing
a dialog that creates space for new, more informed ideas. The first step to beginning this
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work is a critical analysis of the foundational ideas produced by new southern studies
scholars.

5

CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SOUTHERN STUDIES
Though new southern studies was first coined by Houston Baker and Dana D.
Nelson (233), Michael Kreyling is arguably the figure most associated with the beginning
of the movement. His arguments are the foundation upon which those after him would
build. In his scholarly work, Inventing Southern Literature, Kreyling argues that
southernness is not an independent entity but, rather, an invention influenced by the
political and intellectual movement of the Southern (or Nashville) Agrarians, a group
concerned with establishing a singular public vision of the South in which it—and thus
they—remained unmarred by a turbulent historical past and an uncertain industrialized
future. With his monograph, Kreyling reimagines southern intellectual history and paints
the Southern Agrarians as the grand villains of a troubled culture. His rendition of the
southern past is so masterful that it became a critical cornerstone for the work that would
follow it. Kreyling may not have achieved his professed goal of “[dynamiting] the rails”
(ix) of southern exceptionalism, but his work solidified the Nashville Agrarians’ ugly role
in the field’s most accepted versions of southern history. However, suspending
Kreyling’s characterization of the Southern Agrarians renders an alternative rendition of
southern literature visible, a rendition that suggests the constructed South with which
Kreyling takes such issue emerged long before the Southern Agrarians and, in fact, is
present in the most southern of southern literature: the work of William Faulkner.
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Despite Kreyling’s preoccupation with proving the invented-ness of southern
identity, his analysis overlooks a pivotal figure of southern fiction that, perhaps, speaks
most directly to a conception of the South as invention: Thomas Sutpen of William
Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!. From his clearly constructed identity to his doomed
attempt to invent a lifestyle based upon his interpretation of the southern ideal, Sutpen’s
story gives fictional life to Kreyling’s theoretical ideas. However, analyzing these texts in
conjunction to one another bears more fruit than an illustration of Kreyling’s assertions.
Recognizing the ways in which each author relies on the concept of invention to
destabilize a singular version of the South and its history establishes a common ground
between the two works that enables the texts to relate to each other—and the larger
critical discussions about southern identity and history—in insightful ways. Indeed,
putting Kreyling’s Inventing Southern Literature and Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! into
conversation with one another both allows the texts to perform different critical work and
speaks to the pervasive role that the concept of southern invention has played—and
continues to play—within Southern texts and the lives and minds of those who write and
study them.
Described as possessing a “need for haste” (25) and a “furious impatience” (25),
Thomas Sutpen is quite clearly characterized as a man ruthlessly determined to realize a
“dream of castlelike magnificence” (29). The goal for which he aims is not mere
grandeur, however; the image that Sutpen intends to achieve is that of the southern ideal.
He states, “[y]ou see, I had a design in my mind. Whether it was a good or a bad design is
beside the point…I had a design. To accomplish it I should require money, a house, a
plantation, slaves, a family— incidentally of course, a wife. I set out to acquire these,
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asking no favor of any man” (212). As many critics have noted, Sutpen’s fervent impulse
to complete a specific majestic vision likely arises from a boyhood moment in which,
after daring to approach the front door of a plantation house in Tidewater, Virginia, he is
told “never to come to that front door again but to go around to the back” (188) by a
slave. Sutpen’s rejection forces him to recognize the implications of class difference, and
this recognition instills in him a burning desire to gain entrance to the ‘big house’2. While
imparting Sutpen’s story to Shreve, Quentin recalls his Grandfather’s rendition of the
traumatic childhood moment in Sutpen’s history. Quentin states, “he knew that
something would have to be done about it; he would have to do something about it in
order to live with himself for the rest of his life” (189). Thus, after this defining event, the
southern plantation becomes a symbol of Sutpen’s newly-perceived inadequacy, a
symbol that he longs to possess and become ‘master’ of. Sutpen’s determination nearly
pays off, and though he is a stranger in Jefferson “with little else but his bare hands” (39),
he manages to procure one hundred square miles of land and erect a colossal plantation
house.
However, more important to this conversation than the completion of his goal are
the decidedly inventive means by which Sutpen’s vision is realized. The text describes
Sutpen and his men “[dragging] house and formal gardens violently out of the soundless
Nothing…creating the Sutpen’s Hundred, the Be Sutpen’s Hundred like the oldentime Be
Light” (4). Here, the text draws a parallel between the erection of Sutpen’s Hundred and
When defining Sutpen’s character, William J Lowder elaborates on the importance of
this moment in Sutpen’s boyhood, claiming that “The rebuff at the front door…triggered
the first and most important crisis in Sutpen’s life: he suddenly found himself on the
threshold of self-encounter and free choice” (487). Daniel Spoth notices that the incident
in Tidewater is when Sutpen first recognizes that the position of a ‘master’ that decides
who is allowed or disallowed access exists (114).
2
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Christian mythology’s creation story. This connection imbues Sutpen’s invention with a
mythical property—just as the Christian God brought forth his vision of the earth, Sutpen
“dragged house and gardens out of virgin swamp” (30) to create his southern ideal. The
link between Sutpen’s inventive process and the Biblical creation of the world is
hyperbolic in a literal sense, but the shared image of manifesting a particular vision from
nothingness certainly establishes an intimate connection between the two creation stories.
Sutpen is not simply constructing a roof under which to live; he is forcing into being an
invented design of mythic proportion. However, though this passage serves to correlate
Sutpen’s actions with those of the Christian creator, it also subtly foreshadows the futility
of Sutpen’s aims. Indeed, Sutpen builds his plantation out of “virgin swamp” (30), a
source comprised of constantly shifting, decaying matter. Thus, the raw material
employed to erect Sutpen’s vision is inherently, organically linked with degradation and
instability. When considered in light of Kreyling’s assertions about the constructed nature
of southernness, this idea not only foretells the ultimate destruction of Sutpen’s Hundred,
but it also points to the flaw in attempting to merge ideal with reality. That is, Sutpen’s
drawing his plantation from a malleable, ever-changing source can be mapped onto the
southerner’s attempt to build a history—an identity—from impermanent, man-created
rhetoric.
Further, the presence of the French architect also speaks to the role that invention
plays in the building of Sutpen’s Hundred. Much like the “wild blacks” (4) employed to
construct his plantation, the “captive” (4) French architect is employed as a tool to bring
about Sutpen’s vision. Specifically, the architect is described as an artist multiple times
throughout the text. Grandfather Compson reflects that “he was a good architect…not
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only an architect…but an artist since only an artist could have…borne Sutpen’s
ruthlessness and hurry” (28-29). The alignment of the architect with the role of an artist
underscores that the building of Sutpen’s home is a decidedly creative act. That is, his
need for the artist-architect suggests that Sutpen aims to build more than mere brick and
mortar; he intends to create—to invent—a design. The inventive elements of Sutpen’s
Hundred come into clearer focus when framed within the context of Kreyling’s assertions
about southern culture: with the building of his plantation, Sutpen uses his vision of the
southern ideal as a blueprint for the invention of a tangible reality.
Sutpen’s southern design is successfully completed with a respectable marriage to
Ellen Coldfield and the birth of two legitimate children, but reality proves infertile soil
for the fostering of ideals. In the years after the Civil War, fratricide, alcoholism, further
miscegenation, and violent deaths weave their way into Sutpen’s crumbling dynasty. The
downward trajectory of Sutpen’s legend culminates in his death at the hand of a poor
white and the burning down of his beloved plantation house. Thus, though Sutpen strives
tirelessly and laboriously to make his life mirror an invented image, he fails. Moreover,
not only does he fail, but Sutpen’s dogged insistence on a specific type of perfection is
the catalyst for his ultimate doom. His dogged determination to “[build] his house, his
mansion, apparently out of nothing” (7) serves as the defining factor that brings “his
allotted course to its violent (Miss Coldfield at least would have said, just) end” (7). The
rhetorical implications of his failure suggest that, regardless of one’s determination and
desire (for who could be more desirously determined than Thomas Sutpen?), one cannot
wrestle an imaginary ideal from a concrete reality and expect fact and fiction to reside
together harmoniously. This implied assertion illustrates that, much like the historical
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invention of a manifest, solitary South, Thomas Sutpen’s tragic fall operates upon and is
ultimately hindered by the false belief in a mythologized South. Indeed, just as the
Agrarians began an intellectual movement that aimed to invent a unified South but only
served to create confusion and further fragmentation for those who study it, Sutpen’s
quest to invent an imagined ideal fails to establish the respectable legacy for which he
seeks.
While Sutpen’s actions and intentions provide readers with a poignant illustration
of how the southern ideal is a willed, and ultimately false, invention, the critical work that
Kreyling’s ideas allow Faulkner’s novel to accomplish is not limited to a revised reading
of Sutpen’s grand schemes—the text’s presentation of Sutpen’s character carries broader,
historical implications when viewed in conjunction with Kreyling’s ideas. Critics have
long established that Absalom, Absalom! can certainly be interpreted as commentary on
the construction of a historical narrative 3. Though critics have tackled and attempted to
reconcile this problematic coupling through a variety of critical methods, a direct
application of Kreyling’s theory of southern invention to Sutpen’s story provides an
alternative theoretical framework to employ when attempting to resituate and clarify the
novel’s relationship to history. Kreyling’s ideas necessitate a shift in critical focus from
the role that Sutpen plays within a specific historical narrative to what he and his
narrators do within the text, thereby allowing Sutpen’s story to sever its critical ties to an
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Daniel Toth, Patricia Tobin, and Eric Casero, all cited in this essay, are a small
sampling of the critical attention paid to Absalom, Absalom!’s relationship to history.
Further, Cleanth Brooks asserts that “[m]ost important of all, however, Absalom,
Absalom! is a persuasive commentary upon the thesis that much of ‘history’ is really a
kind of imaginative construction” (34). Lynn Gartrell Levins states that “Faulkner fully
intended the story of Thomas Sutpen…to be considered as a part of Southern history”
(35).
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explanation requiring it to fit into a particular historical narrative and become a symbolic
representation of how southernness is created, mythologized, and ultimately propagated.
That is, through the lens of southern invention, Sutpen continues to carry historical
implications, but instead of representing what the South’s history is—a representation
that becomes problematic in any type of analysis—his tale becomes constitutive of how
southernness is invented.
Many aspects of Kreyling’s critical assertions make it a useful tool when
considering Sutpen’s story in relation to the southern history. An exploration and analysis
of the South’s literary tradition—a pivotal component of Kreyling’s project—necessarily
blurs the lines between an area’s fictional past and its factual past by imbuing a region’s
fiction with the agency to do more than serve as a collection of imagined stories. When
attempting to create or analyze a region’s literary history, written works transform into
culturally-inflected, historical artifacts. However, though the study of an area’s literary
history naturally makes itself useful to the study of that area’s literal history, Kreyling’s
rendition of southern literature’s historical trajectory becomes even more fruitful for the
scholar wishing to make sense of a regional past. Kreyling makes it quite clear that he
aims to do more than simply provide a summary of southern literary history. With his
research, Kreyling intends to “interrogate the positivist position” (xii) and its influence on
both the southern literary canon and southern culture. By building his argument on the
assertion that the South’s literature reflects and is complicit in the creation of a specific
southern ideal that aims to “[keep] history at bay” (xii), Kreyling establishes an intensely
dependent relationship between the two ‘types’ of history. This connection invites critics
to extrapolate and map Kreyling’s assertions about the ways in which southern invention
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influenced the South’s literary history onto the invention of a literal southern history;
however, though Kreyling’s analysis makes it clear that “myth and history feed one
another” (xviii), he never fully explores how this idea functions within southern fiction.
In other words, Kreyling analyzes southern literature in relation to how it supports or
questions his theoretical conclusions about southern culture and identity, but he does not
examine how those conclusions function within the narratives of fictional texts.
With the connection that Kreyling’s conception of southern invention creates
between the region’s literary and literal histories in mind, Miss Coldfield and the
Compsons’ depictions of Sutpen not only function as examples of the fragmented
interpretations of a person’s character— an interpretation that has received much critical
attention and exploration4—but also illustrate how humans invent and perpetuate myths
in an effort to maintain and disseminate specific historical narratives. Kreyling asserts
that the mythical becomes historical in how we use it to explain the past and preserve the
future (xi); thus, Absalom, Absalom!’s narrators’ inventions of Sutpen become myth-like
in that they are created in an effort to reconcile each character’s past with the version of
the present that best suits them. The narrators’ active involvement in the creation and
manipulation of different versions of Sutpen’s character highlights the ways in which

Eric Casero claims that “William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! throws the literary
process of narration into serious question; the four main narrators of the story, as well as
the ‘nested’ narrators who narrate from within the narratives of the primary narrators,
present accounts of Thomas Sutpen’s life that often include contradictory sets of detail
and descriptive styles. Consequently, it becomes impossible for a reader to know
precisely what happens in Sutpen’s story or why and how it has attained any
significance” (86). Jonathan S. Cullick acknowledges “that much has been written about
point of view in Absalom, Absalom!, particularly focusing upon the storytelling and
narratological functions of the various narrators” but expands this conversation to include
Sutpen as another vessel of narration employed within the novel.
4
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such invented ideals come into being: through the minds of the people who subsequently
aim to live them.
Early in the text, Quentin makes it clear that Sutpen strikes a mythical figure in
the history of Jefferson. He states, “[knowing about Sutpen] was part of his twenty years’
heritage of breathing the same air and hearing his father talk about the man; a part of the
town’s—Jefferson’s—eighty years’ heritage…Quentin had grown up with that; the mere
names were almost interchangeable and myriad” (7). Clearly, Sutpen comes to represent
more than a mere man in the minds of the Jefferson townspeople. The first depiction of
Sutpen comes from Rosa Coldfield, who “summons” (5) Quentin in order to tell her, and
thus Sutpen’s, story. Though Rosa’s rage to explain her past is veiled behind the
explanation that Quentin is a “Southern gentleman” (5) who may “write about it” (5)
someday, Quentin quickly determines that “she don’t mean [it]” (5) and that the need to
give her version of Sutpen’s character comes from a desire to invent a history in which
she is the victor. Quentin thinks:
It’s because she wants it told he thought so that people whom she will
never see and whose names she will never hear…will read it and know at
last why God let us lose the War: that only through the blood of our men
and the tears of our women could He stay this demon and efface his name
and lineage from the earth. (6)
This passage suggests that the principle driving Rosa’s desire to impart her story to
Quentin derives from a need to invent and propagate a version of history—a myth—
explaining the fall of her family. She wishes to transform Sutpen into a figure which she
can use to justify and make sense of her and her family’s actions. Rosa’s invention,
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however, is not limited to a personal application. With the reference to the lost Civil War,
the text suggests that Rosa intends to build a history that both vindicates her family and
justifies the fall of her South; by fashioning Sutpen into a figure that can carry the blame
of her disgraced family and a beaten South, Rosa creates a manipulated version of history
in which defeat can be explained if not nullified. Thus, Rosa’s creation and dissemination
of a specific rendition of Sutpen’s life aligns with Kreyling’s idea of southern invention
in multiple ways. With Rosa and Quentin’s exchange, the text illustrates southern
invention both with the textual creation of Sutpen’s character through Rosa and with her
expansion of that creation into a particular historical narrative or myth that works in favor
of her chosen belief system.
Further illustrating Kreyling’s concept of invention as it relates to southern
history is the eldest Compson’s version of Sutpen. Like Rosa, Grandfather Compson uses
Sutpen and his story to solidify a particular southern history; however, the history
assigned to him by the Compsons is a much different, though no less applicable, type of
myth. Later in the novel, Quentin relates Sutpen’s unusual southern origins to Shreve.
Born in West Virginia, an area of a South so unspecific at the time of his birth that it does
not yet possess a name—as Shreve points out, “Not in West Virginia…there wasn’t any
West Virgina in 1808” (179)—Sutpen’s origins are far removed from the grandeur with
which he eventually becomes associated:
where what few other people he knew lived in log cabins boiling with
children like the one he was born in-men and grown boys who hunted or
lay before the fire on the floor while the women and older girls stepped
back and forth across them to reach the fire to cook, where the only
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colored people were Indians and you only looked down at them over your
rifle sights. (179)
As this passage makes clear, Sutpen’s beginnings, according to Grandfather Compson,
quite clearly reflect those of the stereotypical mountaineer’s. Critics have addressed
Sutpen’s Appalachian heritage, though not extensively. Lynn Dickerson comments that,
[a]lthough critics have written on practically every aspect of the novel,
they have said little about Sutpen’s mountain heritage. This oversight has
been unfortunate, for the evidence suggests that Faulkner’s choice of a
Southern mountaineer for the protagonist in Absalom, Absalom! was
deliberate. (74)
“[T]he evidence” (74) that Dickerson points to are Sutpen’s “fierce” (75) and “secretive”
(76) nature, his extreme self-reliance (76), and his preoccupation with vengeance (77).
Critics have revised the reading of Sutpen’s mountain identity to an extent since
Dickerson’s article, but the common consensus is that his Appalachian roots function as
yet another way in which the text differentiates Sutpen from his southern
contemporaries5. However, while critics may acknowledge Sutpen’s Appalachian
heritage and its ostracizing effects, the implications of the creative component underlying
the eldest Compson’s description of Sutpen’s beginnings has been largely overlooked. In
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When discussing the literary development of the Appalachian identity, Cratis D.
Williams acknowledges Sutpen’s “southwestern Virginia” roots and subsequently cites
his ultimate destruction as evidence of “Faulkner’s scorn for what he considered the most
vicious variety of poor whites” (9). John C. Inscoe asserts that, rather than appropriating
the mountaineer identity negatively within his fiction, Faulkner actually aligns Sutpen’s
Appalachian past with an “innocence” that “[imbues] it with a moral superiority” (88)
over other southern regions. However, despite his shift in critical approach, Inscoe
maintains the premise that Sutpen’s heritage serves as a way to differentiate him from
traditional southerners (87).
16

light of Kreyling’s definition of southern invention, it becomes clear that the Appalachian
stereotype Grandfather Compson applies to Sutpen’s history is no more than another
example of the human ability to impose invented constructions onto living subjects.
Moreover, Grandfather Compson’s decision to mythologize Sutpen’s identity into a type
of southern ‘other’ illustrates the importance of choice in the southerner’s interpretation
of factual events. Unlike Rosa, who uses Sutpen’s story to make the unjust and illogical
(to her, at least) fall of the South bearable, Grandfather Compson creates a version of
Sutpen that effectively differentiates his failed idea of southernness from their own,
thereby protecting a lifestyle that hinges upon beliefs uncomfortably similar to the ones
from which Sutpen constructs his defeated ideal. That is, the Appalachian identity given
to Sutpen allows the ‘traditionally’ southern Compson to conclude that Sutpen did not
fail because he foolishly attempted to create a false, ‘traditional’ ideal: Sutpen failed
because he was simply not southern enough. Thus, Grandfather Compson’s depiction of
Sutpen’s Appalachian heritage performs more textual work than merely serving as
another element of Sutpen’s difference—the eldest Compson’s ‘authorial’ choices in his
creation of Sutpen’s story illustrates the southern tendency to willfully invent myths and
histories that serve particular purposes.
Though Sutpen’s creative experience and created persona seem clear points of
reference when discussing the inventive component of southern identity, Kreyling’s text
largely omits Sutpen’s tale from his work. What likely bars this aspect of the novel from
Kreyling’s analysis is that, because Sutpen’s character is invented from multiple and
sometimes conflicting sources, readers are given a clouded and complicated rendition of
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Sutpen’s character. From his very entrance into Jefferson, the text makes it clear that
Sutpen is not a traditional southern man:
when they saw him, on a big hard-ridden roan horse, man and beast
looking as though they had been created out of thin air…face and horse
that none of them had ever seen before, name that none of them had ever
heard, and origin and purpose which some of them were never to learn.
(23-24)
Because of his unexplained, strange appearance and lack of an acceptable, respectable
personal history, Sutpen is an outsider among Jefferson’s townspeople—a label that
continues to be applicable throughout his narrative life. However, despite the difference
that Sutpen’s ambiguous origins and persona produce, he cannot be simply classified as a
non-southerner. Though it may be a South of a ‘different’ kind, Sutpen’s Appalachian
heritage produces an unchangeable connection with the South, thereby preventing him
from being dismissed as a non-southerner. Thus, because his unclear relationship with the
South forces him to reside in a space of extreme liminality, Sutpen embodies a
problematic figure who—for the critic attempting to consider Absalom, Absalom! in
connection to southern history—resists inclusion into a unified analysis that hinges on a
figure’s relationship to the South. Kreyling’s analysis of the South posits an argument
that becomes particularly problematic when attempting to place a character with an
unclear southern identity into its structure. At the end of his introduction Kreyling defines
the “side” (xviii) that his work must ultimately “come down on” (xviii) as a selfconscious manipulation of the either/or construction requiring one to relate to southern
history as either a Quentin or a Shreve—a “southern defender” (4) trying to “shut Shreve

18

up” (4) or a non-southerner “[spouting]…stereotype, joke, and pseudo-wisdom” (4).
Kreyling states, “even with the resolve to ignore Quentin and Shreve, it is next to
impossible to talk about the South without them” (4).
Thus, the framework provided by Kreyling that considers the creation of southern
identity largely in relation to where one falls on the spectrum of southernness makes a
character with ambiguous, conflicting origins difficult to wrestle. In order to fit into the
Quentin and Shreve dialectic that Kreyling uses in the construction of his analysis,
Sutpen’s character must be read as either a meta-narrative detailing the vices that lead to
the Old South’s demise or subtle commentary on the inaccessibility of southern culture to
non-southerners. Yet, because he holds a peculiar position that both prevents him from
being a traditional southerner while simultaneously aligning aspects of his identity with
southern culture, Sutpen refuses to accommodate any such explication. The critical
impasse, then, derives from the ambiguity of Sutpen’s origins and cultural affiliation—
the narrators place him in a curious position that is neither fully outsider nor fully
southern. His collection of conflicting identity markers renders it difficult, if not
impossible, to decipher how ‘southern’ Sutpen is or is not, a determination that becomes
vitally important when attempting to fit him into a particular southern narrative. Whether
one rejects or accepts one’s regional identity, one must make a decisive claim to
southernness to be reconciled to its history. Indeed, even a ‘new’ critical approach that
aims to include multiple ‘Souths’ requires the individuals it analyzes to have a clear
relationship to its subject matter—the liminal character, such as Thomas Sutpen, remains
a figure that even inclusive models of the South cannot make room for.
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While Sutpen’s difficult identity perhaps provides a possible logic to Kreyling’s
decision to ‘forget’ about that experience, his dismissal or, at best, oversight of Sutpen’s
inventive process works against Kreyling’s ethical aim of promoting a new, multi-voiced
South. Indeed, the lack of critical attention Kreyling gives to Sutpen’s inventive
experience with the South propagates the problematic, exclusive mode of thought that a
critical analysis of southern self-definition aims to avoid. Though Kreyling recalibrates
the critical approach to southern identity and culture within the literature of the South by
acknowledging and giving credence to dissenting, non-positivist voices, his framework
does not accommodate one whose voice—like Sutpen’s—speaks from an ambiguous
position that rests somewhere in-between southern and not southern. Sutpen’s absence
from this critical conversation reifies the prejudice that one must have a particular
relationship toward southernness to be qualified to speak about the culture. Kreyling’s
work may “resist” (xviii) and revise the single-voiced version of the South adopted by
Quentin Compson (xviii) by expanding the scope of what ‘counts’ as southern, but his
conceptual approach to southernness remains significantly similar to Quentin’s. Just as
Quentin strives to piece together multiple versions of Sutpen’s myth-like history and
invent a figure that can exist comfortably in the world of his father and the world of his
roommate, Kreyling takes the invented histories of the southern thinkers that came before
him and attempts to render a ‘new’ South. Indeed, though they may possess different
ideas about what the South is, both figures allow an entity’s degree of southernness to
function as the defining factor that determines where such an entity fits within a southern
context.
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By depicting how the idyllic vision of the South cannot exist outside of the
particular history that defines it, Sutpen’s character and dynastic legacy illustrate
Kreyling’s assertion that the South as defined by popular myth is a man-manipulated
invention meant to gift the region with a false sense of manifest solidarity. Though
Kreyling frames the problem of southern invention within the context of literary history,
whereas Faulkner approaches the idea from a fictional perspective, the intellectual leap
between Faulkner’s application and Kreyling’s is not a long one. Kreyling simply adopts
what Faulkner implies about the inventive component of southern identity and translates
such implications into critical language, thereby allowing him to show how it
functioned/continues to function in the invention of a distinct southern literary genre.
However, the similarities between Kreyling and Faulkner’s perception of southern
invention stop with the admission of its problematic existence. While Kreyling asserts
that the South’s lack of a transcendent, manifest destiny shakes the idea of southernness
at its very foundation, Faulkner makes no such claim. Though his novels suggest that he
doubtless recognized the problems associated with defining the South based on an
invented schema, Faulkner in no way implies that the South does not deserve defining—
in fact, defining the South is concept that much of his work attempts to address;
Faulkner’s novels complicate a reader’s ideas about southern identity and how she should
relate to it, but he does not question the necessity of exploring such ideas.
Placing Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! in direct relation to Michael Kreyling’s
Inventing Southern Literature both allows these two seminal texts to relate to each other
in useful ways and highlights the persistent role that the theme of southernness as human
invention has played in the work of southern intellectuals. These two texts are separated
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by generation and genre, but each work expresses “the experience of a constant tension
between the self and history” (Kreyling 104) and attempts to come to terms with that
tension. This cyclical relationship between Faulkner and Kreyling’s depictions of the
southern mind speaks to the complicated nature of the South’s many attempts to situate
itself within a national consciousness. As the uncertain concluding remarks of Kreyling’s
scholarly work illustrate, intellectual efforts in regard to southern culture often lead
thinkers back to the same questions rather than provide practical answers (Kreyling 182).
However, the problematic aspects of the South by no means render it an unimportant area
of study; these two authors’ efforts prove that, regardless of its questionable past and
uncertain future, “[telling] about the South” (Faulkner 142) remains a goal worth
pursuing.
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CHAPTER 4
NEW SOUTHERN STUDIES AND POSTMODERN THEORY
Although Michael Kreyling played a pivotal role in the push to question southern
identity and culture, later critics took his ideas and, with the help of postmodern theory,
used them to further annihilate the idea of southern exceptionalism One of the loudest
voices in the new southern studies movement belongs to Jon Smith, author of Finding
Purple America: The South and the Future of American Cultural Studies. In his
monograph, Smith sets out to “shoot the jukebox” that creates and perpetuates the
harmful southern “fantasies” (4) plaguing American cultural studies, “killing [the
fantasies] off” (31), once and for all, and disavowing any lingering conceptions of
distinct southern culture. To achieve his agenda, Smith equips himself with an arsenal of
theoretical terms, the kryptonite of many traditionally-minded southernists. Using the
ideas of a startling array of theorists, Smith moves through southern intellectual history
with his theoretical guns blazing and takes aim at the southern fantasies that have
haunted, confused, and troubled the minds of many. However, Smith’s act of violence on
the South, it seems, is not quite violent enough. While he does a fine job using theoretical
ideas to highlight and articulate the inventive elements of southern culture, his failure to
extrapolate the various theories he relies upon to their logical conclusions renders his
argument ultimately ineffective.
Smith’s argument that the South is a man-made invention is sound, if not mindblowing. He illustrates that “The South” is, indeed, a fantasy of our own design, a
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linguistically-determined construction that has been pieced together by those who
experience it. His error lies in the selective, culture-annihilating conclusions to which he
takes his evidence. He begins his narrative by boiling the South’s continued existence
down to the Lacanian drive for desire. He argues,
[f]rom a Lacanian perspective, we don’t really derive pleasure from
obtaining the object of our desire, we derive pleasure from getting all
worked up about our desire, from the anxiety of not having the
object…what we really like is that it makes us feel desiring, agitated,
stimulated. This is what drives want: not the goal, but the endless circling
thereof. (3-4).
Because of humans’ desire to feel desire, we create circumstances that keep us titillated.
What Smith labels the “crisis fantasy” (3) is one such circumstance, and Southern studies
enacts this crisis fantasy to keep itself enticed and thus alive: “the crisis fantasy [of
Southern studies] is about ‘forgetting’; we are supposed to be endlessly agitated about the
loss of ‘memory’ and hence ‘identity’” (4). The result of this focus on memory results in
a severe, self-inflicted case of what Smith describes as a “free-floating Lacanian drive”
(31), an iteration of Zizek’s “Melancholy” in which the desire for a lost, irretrievable past
creates the conditions of possibility for a distinct southern identity. Southerners, Smith
asserts, have mistaken an imagined lack as a literal loss and fooled themselves into
believing that they exist (34). “White Southern Melancholy” (34), Smith asserts, is so
pervasive that even those who claim to be progressively-minded southernists, such as
Michael Kreyling and Barbara Ladd, unintentionally reinforce agrarian ideology—and
thus southern essentialism—by focusing on memory and the dangers of forgetting

24

southern history (30). Smith charges the critics of “old southern studies” (31) with an
“inability to live in present-day South” (33) and recognize that the infatuation with the
“lost love object” (37) of history forces them to enact a “faked spectacle of excessive,
superfluous mourning” (43) that mimics presence, or existence.
Smith reads Lacan’s theory onto the southern mind correctly in that its
relationship with history and the past is part of what drives its existence, yet he overlooks
how, while the drive sitting at the center of southern identity and culture may be “faked”
(43) into being, the lost love object does, in fact, exist. It may not be physically real, but
it is effectively real and influential in how humans understand the world. Lacan claims,
“in the relation of the imaginary and the real, and in the constitution of the world such
results from it, everything depends on the position of the subject. And the position of the
subject…is essentially characterized by its place in the symbolic world, in other words
the world of speech.” This passage reveals that imagined fantasy is as vital a component
to the “constitution of the world” (“Freud's Papers on Technique” 80) as the real. Further,
the way in which we understand the world is determined by the language we use to
describe it. Humans cannot comprehend the real as it is and are forced to mediate it with
language and fantasy. Lacan scholar Jacques-Alain Miller emphasizes the role of the
symbolic in Lacanian thought. He states that man must “allow himself to be fooled by
these signs to have a chance of getting his bearings amidst them; he must place and
maintain himself in the wake of a discourse and submit to its logic—in a word, he must
be its dupe (xxvii). The lost love object of the South and the desire it produces may be an
imaginary fantasy created by discourse, a symbolic representation of experience with a
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perhaps tenuous connection to material reality, but it is not superfluous and in need of
shooting and is, in fact, foundational to humans’ way of knowing.
Smith’s difficulty with terms continues when he attempts to establish a dichotomy
between what he describes as the “’real’” world and the “populist” world, a term
borrowed from marketing theorist Douglass B. Holt that “come[s] to represent a
particular kind of story—an identity myth—that their consumers use to address identity
desires and anxieties…they carry a heavy symbolic load” (9). Using this theory as a
foundation, Smith argues that southernist scholarship prefers to talk about the populist
world rather than the “real” one in the hope—whether admittedly or no—of perpetuating
imagined southern fantasies. He states,
When in 1962, at the height of the civil rights movement, Louis D. Rubin
Jr., paraphrasing the Nashville agrarians, described the South as “a
society…in which leisure, tradition, aesthetic and religious impulses had
not been lost in the pursuit of economic gain”…he was describing not the
real world but a populist one, a potent source of identity myths for a
certain sort of tweedy, out-of-touch, and very white mandarin. (10)
Here, Smith suggests that focusing on a populist world of stories and symbols feeds into
the “narcissistic insecurities” (16) running rampant within southern ideology in ways that
attention given to the real world does not. However, Smith leaves readers wondering
what, exactly, he considers as the real world. As stated previously, Smith’s “real” seems
to refer to reality, as in what humans really experience opposed to the fantasies that we
construct around these experiences. Thus, the “real” world that Smith alludes to must be a
place free from narrative, a space in which no individual subject participates in any type
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of ideologically-charged reification of narcissistic, man-made myths. Smith argues that
we must “learn to look at the world ‘in its senseless actuality’ as Zizek likes to put
it…not fill it with our libidinal investments, our enjoyment” (4). To avoid such personal
enjoyment, Smith intends to “keep [his] subject position unreified and in line with the
argument of this book” (18-19).
Unfortunately, Smith’s intention is impossible, as there is no knowable actuality
without an individual to sense it. Humans are limited by language-bound interpretation,
and are thus unable to experience anything without the assistance of the discourses
helping us order our worlds. To live and perceive is to interpret, disallowing any
individual, even Jon Smith, to step outside of the system and deem one version of reality,
or the real, more legitimate than the other. Derrida made it clear long ago that the act of
interpretation is simultaneously an act of contamination, as one cannot perceive without
the help of a narrative-bearing, subject-locating ideology (“Nietzsche and the Machine”).
The pure subject position sitting outside of human ways of knowing that Smith’s real
world requires is impossible and, like its populist counterparts, creatively imagined. At
points in Smith’s narrative, he hints at a concession toward his inability to assume an
objective subject position but never quite commits to the claim. He writes, “I hope to
come closer to describing how most people actually construct identity” (19); and “this
book seeks not to be definitive of anything (least of all “identity”) but to model an
approach that might be more fruitfully applied [to southern studies]” (21). With
statements such as these, Smith attempts to acknowledge the instability of subjectivity
(arguably as a preemptive response to possible critique) but only backs himself into a
corner, as all his semi-concessions are undergirded by a belief in his ability to occupy the
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“unreified” (18) subjectivity of his choosing. He cites Judith Butler and her idea of the
performative as evidence for the type of subjectivity to which he aims, but his treatment
of this idea sidesteps a vital element of her theory: Butler makes it clear that subjectivity
may be performed, but it is a performance in which the subject has no choice. That is, a
subject is created through performance and does not exist prior to it (Butler 520). By
claiming an ability to approach identity-making from an consciously assumed objective
position, Smith not only suggests that he does, in fact, know what identity is but also that
he understands identity-making enough to manipulate the process and subsequently bring
his findings back to the masses, or “most people” (19). This assertion is not only
unsupported by the theory Smith draws upon to build it but is actually counterproductive
to the correction Butler’s work aims to achieve.
Along with standing upon the shoulders of a questionable theoretical framework,
Smith’s notion that he can occupy an “unreified” (18) subject position that allows him to
sense a reality existing outside of human involvement subtly reinscribes a claim to the
essentialism he denounces. Smith makes it clear that, unlike the real world, populist
worlds such as “the South” are built from a variety of pregnant, agenda-carrying stories
and should therefore be dismissed in favor of the non-constructed real world. The
privileging of the real over its symbolic counterpart covertly draws upon the claim to
authenticity that it overtly disavows. Although Smith calls it “real” rather than
“essential,” he continues to reify the belief that there must be something that supersedes
human experience. The real/populist dichotomy looks quite different than the
essentialist/constructivist binary of “old southern studies” (31), but it functions similarly.
By assuming that he can transcend ideological reification, Smith suggests that he is in
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tune with a natural humanness untouched by discourse, an “essential” identity, and can
thus see the world through a clearer lens. In doing so, he performs the same cognitive
move that he demonizes, instilling himself with the ability to distinguish between
“fantasy” and “reality.” Smith may pose as an arbiter of truth, but he remains a mythmaker.
Further, although Smith imbues his interpretation of the South’s mournful
melancholy with a sense of epiphany, this move is neither original nor an indictment that
should be used so selectively against the South. Philosophers have long struggled with
the roles that memory, history, and forgetting play in the knowledge production of
thinking beings. Nietzsche’s work in particular plays with the concept of forgetfulness in
ways that are similar to Smith’s. In Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lies and a Nonmoral
Sense” forgetfulness is posited as a vital component of truth-making.
It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of
fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade just indicated. If he will
not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will
not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for
illusions...If truth alone had been the deciding factor in the genesis of
language, and if the standpoint of certainty had been decisive for
designations, then how could we still dare to say "the stone is hard," as if
"hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally
subjective stimulation! (81-82)
Like Smith, Nietzsche’s work asserts that deception and forgetfulness are necessary
conditions of possibility for any sort of stable, repeatable knowledge; that is, we must
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forget about the lies we tell ourselves in order to exist. Smith and Nietzsche differ,
however, in the scope of their conclusions—Nietzsche troubles the concept of truth and
understanding, broadly construed, but does not suggest that human created knowledge is
moot or ineffectual. Nietzsche asks us to rethink what constitutes truth, but he allows it to
continue functioning as a formative element of human understanding. Conversely, Smith
uses these ideas as grounds for destruction, claiming that the creative component of
southern fantasy (he forgets that all forms of knowledge are constructed, not just those
deriving from “the South”) means we should, in his language, “shoot” it.
Smith’s selective theoretical application and the faulty, agenda-serving
conclusions that he thus delivers illustrate a lack of scholarly rigor that, even when read
generously, delivers the killing blow to his argument. At a pivotal, defining moment in
his text, Smith claims:
“the South” is, for me, a meaningless term, naming nothing but fantasies:
either a great, 100-million-resident void at the heart of American studies,
or a ridiculously strained attempt at identity politics as the heart of old
southern studies. “Alabama” is more coherent and manageable as a site of
modernity, one where the tugs of past and future, space and place, and so
on mingle in very complicated ways” (22).
To Smith, then, “Alabama” is a “coherent” term and “the South” a “meaningless” one
because of the “fantasies” (22) that the latter requires to operate. What he overlooks is
that even his Alabama, with its manageability and complicated mingling, is in itself
nothing but a construction of his own design. That is, Alabama means something to
Smith because he allows it to, not because there is a “real,” touchable Alabama that exists
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in the world. With this quote, Smith reveals the contradiction at the heart of his study: by
resting his argument upon the proposition that the South’s constructed-ness renders it a
dismissible fantasy, he lays the groundwork for a discussion that, when extrapolated to its
logical end, should not only prove the South as fantasy but also suggest that any form of
human knowledge is also fantasy. Under the terms that Smith sets forth, that human
involvement means a culture should be dismissed as illusion, then all cultures should be
dismissed—if there is no South, then there is no nation, no Earth, and certainly no
individual with a subjectivity that can transcend the necessity of these terms and
categories that we make in the effort to know. Yet, Smith stops short of a thorough
application of his theories and focuses solely on Southern culture. Smith fails in his
expressed aim of bringing reality to the South and, instead, simply replaces one type of
fantasy with another. Indeed, if Smith’s goal is to kill the false fantasies that disguise
themselves as truth, then “shooting the jukebox” is not going to do the job. Indeed, the
only way for Smith to rid himself of human meddling and the populist worlds that it
produces, once and for all, is to turn his weapon on himself and “shoot” the thinking
subject wielding the gun.
Considering the branch of Southern studies with which Smith associates himself,
his confusion blind determination to serve as a theory-wielding source of liberation for,
what he considers, the field’s delusion is indicative of larger, long-established tensions
within Southern studies scholarship. Although Smith tries to place his argument within
the larger context of American studies by claiming that “American studies and southern
studies have been stuck” in similar “old forms of enjoyment” (6), the general discussion
of American studies quickly gives way to a specific discourse of Southern studies. In the
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introduction to Smith’s monograph, Smith draws clear lines between the Southern studies
that he associates with, the new southern studies (the title of the collection in which his
book is published), and the “old southern studies,” a group of scholars who, according to
Smith, spend far more time worrying over having “Lost Something Very Important” (6)
than pursuing admirable scholarship. The concluding sentence of Smith’s text claims that
“[cultural studies] is not a matter of choosing sides” (135), but the rest of his work
deliberately differentiates the type of scholarship he participates in and the unethical and
outdated methods of “old southern studies.” This group of work serves as Smith’s foil,
the illuminating backdrop upon which to contrast his argument. Even down to the very
construction of the monograph, Smith calls on the traditions or tendencies of “old
southern studies” (31) scholarship to drive his argument in new directions. He states:
we have also reached the point in the opening chapter at which one is
supposed to talk about oneself, to lay one’s own identification cards on the
table, as it were, in order to avoid the “voice from nowhere” of much
twentieth-century social science…[ yet] I cannot in good faith do the
same. (17)
With this move, Smith positions himself within the traditional Southern studies milieu
only to reject it—he uses it a means of identification by negation. Here, Smith’s work
performs the complicated movement between dependence and destruction that
characterizes the relationship between “old” (31) and New southern studies; these
branches of southernist scholarship both hate and rely upon one another.
Deleuze and Guattari’s work proves useful when trying to understand the
trajectory New southern studies has followed. In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,
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Deleuze and Guattari assert that a minor literature deterritorializes a major literature by
adopting the dominant language and doing something atypical with it (16). New southern
studies, though not comprised of fictional works, is a body of literature and, more
importantly, a body of literature that developed from a politically-charged desire to
differentiate itself from the field of Southern studies at large. In this way, the new
southern studies’ ‘minor’ relationship to a ‘major’ counterpart allows it to deterritorialize
the concept of “the South” and create a variation of what it means to think and write
about it. New southern studies, then, deterritorialzes the work and ideologies of their
scholarly forefathers to reterritorialize and create something “new.”
The desire to de/reterritorialize is, in itself, is a productive one; however, as
Smith’s work suggests, the particular way in which New southern studies scholars have
gone about the process of de/reterritorializing the sub-field’s ideology, or its BwO, is
more indicative of a desire for a certain political position rather than a desire for truth;
they have “[botched]” (149) the process. Historically, southern intellectual history has
held a strong aversion to theory and, indeed, intellectualism in general. As Tara Powell
asserts, the South has had an uncomfortable relationship with all things intellectual from
its very emergence (1-2). Anne Goodwyn Jones builds upon this idea, claiming:
the absence of theory from the South has been a historical preoccupation
of southerners born and trained. In the twentieth century alone, the liberal
and the conservative traditions can be distinguished by their response to
the absence of what has usually been called, in the discourse of southern
literary criticism, not theory but “abstraction.” The Agrarians in I’ll Take
My Stand believed that abstraction was a destructive, capitalist, northern
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habit that derived from the cash nexus and would, if not resisted, destroy
the concreteness and personalism of the South. (173)
When understanding New southern studies as a minorization process, this passage is
particularly important, as it speaks to both the South’s historical distaste for high-minded
theoretical ideas and lays the blame for such distaste at the feet of the southern Agrarians,
the men who are responsible for the push to clearly define and differentiate the South. In
the political process of deterritorializing traditional Southern studies ideology, new
southern studies’ need to aggressively reject a distinct South via the agenda-driven use of
theory indicates its desire to occupy a different ideological and political position. Put
differently, though the sub-field’s professed goal is to bring “reality” to the South via
theoretical ideas calling the idea of stable identities into question, the scholarship it
produces—work that, like Smith’s, is more focused on proving the South’s non-existence
than using theory rigorously—suggests that the “real” goal of such scholarship is to
reclaim the field in the name of a reworked ideology, one that arguably corrects the social
and political missteps of its predecessors by unequivocally rejecting it. At a key point in
his introduction, Smith claims that his experience working in Old Southern studies was
much like being “plopped down in the midst of a community overdetermined by,
fantasies, obsessions, and enthusiasms [I] not only don’t share but cant in good faith ever
bring [himself] to share” (6). Here, Smith hints at the hidden “libidinal impulse” driving
his questionable reclamation of the South: the need to distance himself, and Southern
studies, from its unquestionably horrid past. This impulse, though admirable, has
produced work that is more political than scholarly and unknowingly establishes a
discourse that seems very much like the evil essentialism of “old southern studies,” just
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placed in different terms. Effectively, new southern studies has done nothing for the
study of the South but offer an alternative method of “circling” (3) around its definition.
The current cultural climate of the South tells us that, despite Smith’s (and others like
him) refusal to “share” the “fantasies” (6) of old southern studies (31), the effects of these
fantasies are indeed “real” in that they are active, sometimes deadly, forces in the world.
Telling the South it does not exist has done nothing to change it, and it is time for
Southern studies to try something really “new.”
Despite its problematic findings, the bulk of Finding Purple America: The South
and the Future of American Cultural Studies is a useful inquiry into the constructed-ness
of identity and region. In the concluding chapter, Smith once again calls upon a form
traditionally associated with southern literature—the pastoral—and provides a detailed
account of his garden in Alabama:
My backyard garden is sited on the steep north slope of Red Mountain in
Birmingham, Alabama, about 60 vertical feet from the ridgeline and about
250 feet above downtown. In front of our home extends a suburban
landscape of half-century-old houses. There is not a front porch in my
entire neighborhood; whether despite or because of this. the homes—
which I might generously describe as “midcentury modern”—exude a
remarkable 1950s optimism not ordinarily associated with the South, and
rom every window in the front of the house we can see, on a clear fall day,
between five and fifteen miles. (Even in the post-bubble Los Angeles real
estate market, this would be a multi-million dollar view…)…the site is
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thus classically liminal, on threshold between automobile grid and curving
mountainside.” (129-130)
Smith goes on to detail the specific make-up of his garden, with its exotic-to the-South
“daphnes, gardenias, camellias” (131) and its native “bougainvillea” and “Ashe’s
magnolia” (131). With this description, Smith uses his garden as an analogy of the
South’s constructed unoriginality; he aims to show how his southern garden is really not
so southern, after all. However, aside from reinscribing a detailed attention to landscape
(Smith claims his “garden labors” are not evidence of his “southern ‘sense of place’” or
“‘attachment to the land’” (131) because he includes references to suburbia, but,
regardless of the intentions with which he imbues his prose, the land remains a focal
point of the chapter—how southern!), the hodge-podge collection growing in Smith’s
semi-southern garden actually serves as an expert illustration of the ways in which
constructed gardens—or identities and cultures—are necessarily, unequivocally unique;
if not for Smith’s intervention, his garden would remain a homogenous trek of
“hardwood forest” (129)—it is only with Smith’s help that his backyard becomes
something different, something specifically identifiable. Perhaps essentialism and
uniqueness are more easily conflated when seen from a “multi-million dollar view”
(129), but, from a less elevated positon, it seems that all of Smith’s hard work to murder
the South only makes it stronger. Guns are no match for ideology, and as long as people
continue to talk about the South—even to say it is not real—the South will continue to act
in the world; it will continue to exist. In the end, Smith’s violence against the South
simply adds more fuel to its fire.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
New southern studies brought theory to the South, but they did so in a way that
could benefit from revision. The South cannot, in fact, happen anywhere else, not
because the South is special but because it is specific. Would southern literature use the
same imagery, tropes, and metaphors if plantations had been built in deserts rather than
swamps? If slaves were white and their owners black? Probably not. Cultures, regions,
and places emerge through the material and the discursive. Language gives us the ability
to name things, but there still has to be something to name. Though new southern studies
aims to correct the field’s tendency to, whether knowingly or otherwise, perpetuate a
conception of the South that reiterates harmful ideologies, it merely leads southernists’
noses ever-closer to their own bellies. Indeed, the South existing outside of discourse has
been laid to rest by new southern studies scholarship, but it continues to manifest itself in
powerful ways. Despite the South’s critical death, it continues, effectively, to live.
To disrupt the cycle in which southern studies has found itself, critics must
produce a new visioning of the South, one that takes seriously both the materials and the
discursive practices that allow the South to emerge. A material-discursive rendering of
the South that conceives of southern culture as the result of multiple forces, both
discursive and material, coming together and effecting a mode of being, a phenomena, an
assemblage that produces the specific cultures and identities associated with the
American South. This conception will be an affirmative visioning that, instead of forcing
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the South into an either/or configuration that sets seemingly opposing forces against one
another, will construe southernness as an active, ever-emerging entity—or style—that is
equally informed by the material and the discursive, the mind and the body. The
theoretical framework for this re-visioning will be grounded in the work of continental
philosophers whose thoughts make room for an analysis that questions the very
foundation of how the knowable world is produced. More specifically, the ideas of
Deleuze, Derrida, Nietzsche, and Foucault will serve as the basis for this analysis. From
this foundation, the sources from which previous scholars have drawn their pictures of
the South—southern literature and historical narratives—will be revisited, but with an
orientation based on a material-discursive practice paradigm focusing on action and being
rather than definition.
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